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A NEW AGE OF DIsCOvERY: YouR TRADE
SECRETS ARE SAFE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets has long been a great
concern in the business community. This concern is magnified when a business
involved in litigation is served with a discovery request that seeks to access
such secret information. While many jurisdictions have adopted legislation
designed to help businesses protect trade secrets, few have included provisions
requiring courts to take specific measures to provide protection for this type of
information during the discovery process. Courts in these jurisdictions rely on
existing rules of civil procedure to provide the necessary protection for material
that is determined to be a trade secret.
With the enactment ofthe South Carolina Trade Secrets Act (Trade Secrets
Act),' South Carolina has crossed into new territory by requiring courts to take
several steps before allowing discovery of information that its holder designates
as a trade secret. This comment examines the amendments to Chapter 8 of Title
39 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, which effectively repealed South
Carolina's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act2 and replaced it with the
South Carolina Trade Secrets Act. Specifically, this comment inspects the
discovery provisions found in section 39-8-60 of the Trade Secrets Act. Parf II
begins with a brief discussion of why trade secrets deserve special protection
during litigation and an overview of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Part III
focuses on the discovery provisions in the Trade Secrets Act and how South
Carolina's new method of protecting secret information during the discovery
process compares to the route taken by other jurisdictions. The final section
analyzes the constitutionality of the legislation and whether it infringes upon
the South Carolina Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Trade Secrets and the Needfor Protection

The distinction between trade secrets and patented material has long been
a source of confusion. Trade secrets and patents share an important similarity:

1. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
2. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
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they are both a source of competitive advantage.' However, they confer this
advantage very differently. A valid patent provides a legal monopoly over
some property or process, such as an invention, by granting its holder the
exclusive right to make, use, or sell the invention in the United States for
twenty years.' The inventor is given this monopoly in exchange for full
disclosure of the patented material.' The subject matter of the patent becomes
public knowledge, but the holder of the patent retains the right to prevent
anyone else, even an inventor who subsequently discovers the same idea
entirely on his own, from using the patented idea or invention.6 This window
of absolute protection for a patentee "is the price the public pays for [this]
disclosure." 7
In contrast, a trade secret is information used in one's trade or business that
gives its holder an advantage over competitors who do not possess the secret."
However, unlike patented material, information constituting a trade secret is not
legally protected from use by others.9 Consequently, anyone who discovers the
contents of a trade secret by fair means is at liberty to use the information with
impunity. 0 However, unlike a patentee's monopoly, a trade secret holder's
advantage is not subject to predetermined expiration; instead, the holder of a
trade secret "'may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely.""'
But in the final analysis, a trade secret is valuable only so long as its holder can
prevent its unlimited disclosure.
Thus, corporations involved in litigation are often concerned that the court
will compel disclosure of trade secrets during discovery. Although these secrets
may be relevant to the adjudication of a claim, the protection of such secrets is
vital to the continuing development of new technology. A company's incentive
to invest in research, which is essential to the conception and development of
new products, is contingent upon maintaining the confidentiality of information
learned during the research process. 2 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that disclosure of this sensitive information in the judicial process
threatens continued innovation and competitiveness and strips information

3. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. CI. 1961).

4. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
5. DuPont,288 F.2d at 911.

6. Id.

7. 2RoGERM.MLGRIM, MEGRiMONTRADESEcR s § 8.02[4] (1997) (citing Flanigan v.
Ditto, Inc., 84 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1936)).
8. Cheme Indus., Inc. v. Grounds &Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 89-90 (Minn. 1979)
(citing Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)).
9. See Du Pont, 288 F.2d at 911.
10. Id
11. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting United States

v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)).
12. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 472 (1991).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/11
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developers of the advantages the trade secret would have provided in the
marketplace. 3 Finally, dissemination of trade secrets during litigation has been
blamed for decreases in stock prices14 and negative effects on a corporation's
public image. 5
B. The Uniform Trade SecretsAct
In response to the growing concern over the protection of trade secrets, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979.16 Section five of the Uniform Act
addresses the role of courts in protecting trade secrets during the discovery
phase of ajudicial proceeding." However, it fails to clearly specify how courts
should provide this protection. Section five merely states that courts "shall
preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means."'" The
section then suggests four nonexclusive methods a court may employ to satisfy
this requirement 9 These suggestions include "granting protective orders...,

13. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974).
14. See generally Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 201 (3d. Cir. 1989) (involving an
assertion that disclosure of secret information caused stock prices to drop 33%); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 90 (D.N.J. 1986) (evaluating a claim that disclosure of
information caused "wide gyrations in the values of the defendants' stock").
15. Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (questioning
whether disclosure of information would harm the defendant's reputation as a safe blood
collector).
16. UNIF. TRADE SECRErs AcT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990) [hereinafter
UNIFoRM AcT]. This act provides:
§ 1. Definitions.
As used in this [Act], unless the context requires otherwise:
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,
that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
§ 5. Preservation of Secrecy.
In an action under this [Act], a court shall preserve the secrecy of an
alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting
protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding
in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering
any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade

secret without prior court approval.
17. See UNiFORM ACT § 5, 14 U.L.A. 461 (1990).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any
person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without
prior court approval."2
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation
based on the Uniform Act.2 With the exception of South Carolina, no
jurisdiction has expanded section five, and most jurisdictions have incorporated
this section's general language directing courts to use "reasonable means" to
prevent the dissemination of trade secrets during the discovery phase of a
judicial proceeding. South Carolina's trade secret law now includes stringent
requirements for courts to follow when discovery requests involve trade
secrets. Unlike South Carolina, most jurisdictions that have passed legislation
designed to protect trade secrets have relied on existing rules of civil procedure

to empower courts to take measures to prevent the dissemination of material
that either party considers to be a trade secret. 22
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The South CarolinaTrade Secrets Act

In 1992 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the predecessor of
the Trade Secrets Act, which was virtually identical to the Uniform Act.'

20.Id.
21. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to .945 (Michie
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANm. §§ 44-401 to -407 (West 1956); ARK. CODEANN. §§ 4-75-601 to
-607 (Michie 1996); CAL. CvIL CODE §§ 3426 to 3426.11 OVest 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 774-101 to -110 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1958); DEL. CODEANN.
tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to -510 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 688.001 to .009 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (1994); HAw. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807 (1997); 765 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. 1065/1 to 1065/9 (West 1993); IND. CODEANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (Michie 1996);
IOWA CODEANN. §§ 550.1 to .8 (West 1997); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330
(West Supp. 1996); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880 to .900 (Michie 1996); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 51:1431 to :1439 (West 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541 to 1548 (West
1964); MD. CODEANN., COM. LAW I §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01
to .08 (West 1995); MIss. CODEANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450 to
.467 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 87-501 to -507 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010 to .100 (Michie 1994); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 350-13:1 to -B:9 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (Michie 1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to .1-08 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61 to .69
(Anderson Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85 to 94 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 646.461 to .475 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (1992); S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-8-10
to -130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFEDLAWS §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (Michie 1994); UTAH
CODEANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4601 to 4609 (Supp. 1997); VA.
CODEANN. §§ 59.1-336 to .1-343 (Michie 1992); WASH. REv. CODEArN. §§ 19.108.010 to .940
(Vest 1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 1989).
22. See infra notes 38-73 and accompanying text.
23. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
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Passage of the 1992 legislation reflected the pro-business attitude of the state's
leaders in the early 1990s. 4 South Carolina's rise as a leading contender for

new business development led to a concerted effort by many of the state's
leaders to create incentives designed to lure new businesses to the state.2 In
1997, the General Assembly replaced South Carolina's version of the Uniform
Act with the Trade Secrets Act. With the exception of section 39-8-60(B), the

Trade Secrets Act does not substantially alter the original version. Section 398-60(B), an entirely new provision, commands that courts take specific
measures and make detailed findings before allowing discovery of information
that one party to a judicial proceeding claims is a trade secret.26
The Trade Secrets Act retains the general provisions found in section five
of the Uniform Act regarding the courts' role in protecting trade secrets during
judicial proceedings.' This provision bestows upon a court the authority and
power to use reasonable means to protect a trade secret. 28 Although the new
Trade Secrets Act suggests protective measures, the trial judge has discretion
to determine which means to use. 29 However, with regard to the discovery
phase of a proceeding, the Trade Secrets Act goes farther. Section 39-8-60(B)
requires that courts take specific action when a party seeks discovery of
information that is regarded by its holder as a trade secret.30 This section

24. See generally 1996 S.C. DEP'T COM. ANN. REP. 4 [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]
(explaining many of the steps taken by the state to attract new business and encourage the growth
of existing businesses). The genesis of this effort was the General Assembly's formation of the
South Carolina Department of Commerce in 1993. One of the Department's overall goals is to
attract and maintain economic growth in the state. The Department comprises five divisions.
While each of the five divisions has an impact on attracting new business to the state, two of the
divisions have responsibilities that are tied directly to attracting new investment. The Business
Development Department is viewed as the front line in the state's efforts to attract new business.
Id. The Technology Development division is responsible for developing strategies to attract
high-tech companies to South Carolina. Id. at 5.
25. John Welbes, IncentivesforAiken Tire PlantRepresent Trendas State Lures Industries,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Oct. 5, 1997, at G1. Welbes highlighted several economic
incentives, such as property tax reductions, that South Carolina has used to lure large business
projects in recent years. Welbes concludes, "When a large project has beckoned, the state hasn't
hesitated to provide substantial economic incentives." Id.
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).

27. § 39-8-60(A).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Section 39-8-60(B) provides:
In any civil action where discovery is sought of information designated by
its holder as a trade secret, before ordering discovery a court shall first
determine whether there is a substantial need by the party seeking
discovery for the information.
"Substantial need" as used in this section means:
(1) the allegations in the initial pleading setting forth the
factual predicate for or against liability have been plead with
particularity;
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commands courts to determine whether the party seeking discovery has a
"substantial need" for the material for purposes of preparing its case." In
essence, the statute establishes a four-part inquiry that the party seeking
discovery must satisfy in order to gain access to the information. First, the court
must examine the party's initial pleading to determine whether a "factual
predicate for or against liability" is established therein. 2 Second, the court must
determine whether the information being sought is "directly relevant" to the
case. 3 Third, the court must find that the party seeking discovery of the
information will be "substantially prejudiced" if denied access.34 Finally, the
court must conclude that information derived from the trade secret will be
admissible at trial.35 This four-part inquiry was absent from South Carolina's
version of the Uniform Act,and no similar provision exists in the trade secrets
act of any other jurisdiction. The inquiry places the burden squarely on the
party seeking discovery to prove it has a substantial need for the information
without requiring the company or individual opposing discovery to show why
the information should not be revealed.

The General Assembly has a clear motive for incorporating this restrictive
provision in the amended version of the Trade Secrets Act. The pro-business
provisions go to great lengths to protect information that is allegedly vital to a
company's livelihood and competitive edge in the marketplace. This type of
legislation furthers the state's efforts to attract relocating businesses, especially
in the manufacturing and technology fields, which bring new jobs and
investment capital.36 Additionally, the increased protection curbs the risk of
lawsuits being filed against businesses for the sole purpose of forcing
3
disclosure of confidential information during the course of litigation. 1
However, it also provides a wealth of protection for parties opposing discovery
of such information while leaving opposing parties at a distinct disadvantage.

(2) the information sought is directly relevant to the allegations
plead with particularity in the initial pleading;
(3) the information is such that the proponent of the discovery
will be substantially prejudiced if not permitted access to the
information; and
(4) a good faith basis exists for the belief that testimony based
on or evidence deriving from the trade secret information will be
admissible at trial.
§ 39-8-60(B).
31. Id.

32. § 39-8-60(B)(1).
33. § 39-8-60(B)(2).
34. § 39-8-60(B)(3).
35. § 39-8-60(B)(4).
36. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at A-4. This table shows that in 1996 new
manufacturing investment in South Carolina totaled greater than five billion dollars, and the
manufacturing sector served as the source of over 19,500 new jobs.
37. See Miller, supranote 12, at 471.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/11
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B. The Discovery ProvisionsContainedin the South CarolinaTrade
Secrets Act Are Not the Most Effective Means of Providing
BalancedProtectionDuringLitigation
South Carolina is the first jurisdiction to adopt legislation based on the
Uniform Act that adds special provisions targeted at the protection of trade
secrets during the discovery phase of a trial. Courts in most jurisdictions have
employed existing rules of civil procedure to determine whether discovery of
information containing trade secrets should be allowed. 8 These jurisdictions
typically use an analysis based on Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 9 to achieve the same goals the General Assembly envisioned when
it enacted section 39-8-60(B). Like many states, South Carolina has adopted,
verbatim, Federal Rule 26(c). 40 This rule provides in relevant part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought... the court... may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including... (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information
41
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.
At first blush, section 39-8-60(B) of the Trade Secrets Act appears to
provide courts with better guidance because it establishes a rigid test they must
follow when evaluating discovery requests. However, Rule 26(c)(7) is a
superior mechanism because the rule allows courts to fashion this needed
protection based on the individual circumstances of each case. Through years
of applying the rule, courts have developed an effective test that balances the
rights and interests of both the party seeking discovery of the information and
the party desiring to keep the information secret.
Courts have recognized that "'there is no absolute privilege for trade
secrets and similar confidential information.' 42 However, courts have

38. See infra notes 42-73 and accompanying text.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
40. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
41. Id.
42. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979) (quoting 8
ALAN WRIGHT

&

CHARLES

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE- § 2043, at 300

(1970)); see Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir.
1981); Gohlerv. Wood, 162 F.R.D. 691, 693 (D. Utah 1995); Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.1RD.
506,507 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.RLD. 288, 292 (D.
Del. 1985); Direct Sales Tire Co. v. District Court, 686 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Colo. 1984) (en banc);
Beta Squared, Inc. v. Thor Designs, No. 307139, 1993 WL 128530, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
19, 1993); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Power Transmission Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A.11364, 1991
WL 29957, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991).
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generally recognized the need to provide protection for this type of information
and have used a three-prong balancing test based on Rule 26(c) to determine
when such protection is necessary. The first two prongs of the test are derived
from the "good cause" requirement43 found in Rule 26(c)(7), which requires a
party resisting disclosure to establish why protection is necessary. 4 The first
prong requires the party resisting disclosure to demonstrate that the requested
information actually constitutes a trade secret. 45 Most jurisdictions adopting the
Uniform Act's definition46 have relied on four factors to determine whether
material is a trade secret.47 These factors include: "(1) the extent to which
information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which information
is known to those inside the business; (3) the measures taken to guard the
secrecy of the information; and (4) the value of the information to the business
and its competitors. 48
The second prong of the test looks at whether disclosure of the information
would result in "cognizable harm" to the party opposing discovery.49 The
objecting party must show that disclosure is likely to result in a serious and
identifiable injury. 0 Although hard and fast rules concerning this showing have

43. Although many courts treat this as a two-prong test, some consolidate and rely on one
six-factor test to determine whether the party opposing discovery has proven that good cause for
protection exists. The first four factors are identical to the factors used in the first prong of the
two-part test. However, courts using the consolidated approach also consider "[t]he amount of
effort or money expended by the defendant in developing the information" and "ft]he ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others." State
ex rel. Arrow Concrete Co. v. Hill, 460 S.E.2d 54, 57 (W.Va. 1995) (quoting State ex rel.
Johnson v. Tsapis, 419 S.E.2d 1, 3 (,V. Va. 1992)).
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
45. See Gohler, 162 F.R.D. at 693.
46. See UNIFORM ACT § 1(4), supra note 16.
47. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(finding that plaintiff failed to satisfy four factors required for information to be considered a
trade secret). The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act attempts to clarify the Uniform Act's
definition:
A trade secret may consist of a simple fact, item, or procedure, or a series
or sequence of items or procedures which, although individually could be
perceived as relatively minor or simple, collectively can make a substantial
difference in the efficiency of a process or the production of a product, or
may be the basis of a marketing or commercial strategy. The collective
effect of the items and procedures must be considered in any analysis of
whether a trade secret exists and not the general knowledge of each
individual item or procedure.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20(5)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
48. Barron's,428 F. Supp. at 203.
49. Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.R.D. 506, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); see Pulsecard, Inc. v.
Discover Card Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A.94-2304-EEO, 1995 WL 526533, at *5-6 (D. Kan. Aug.
31, 1995) (quoting Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th
Cir. 1981)).
50. Jacqueline S. Gu6ngo, Trends in Protective Orders Under FederalRule of Civil
Procedure26(c): Why Some Cases Fumble While Others Score, 60 FoRDHAM L. Rnv. 541, 554
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been labeled inappropriate, courts have found that conclusory statements about
generalized harm are not sufficient to satisfy this part of the test.5' Mere
allegations will not guarantee protection under this test. 2 When litigation
involves a competitor, a corporation has an easier time establishing a defined
injury to its business if it can demonstrate a threat to financial well-being. 3
The burden of satisfying the first two prongs of this test rests with the party
opposing disclosure of the information. 4 Placing the burden on this party is
proper for two reasons. First, because evaluation of these factors determines
whether good cause for protection exists, the party attempting to prevent
discovery should be required to prove why protection is necessary. Second, the
party resisting discovery is in the best position to prove these factors because
it is likely to be the only party with ready access to necessary documentation.
If the party challenging discovery satisfies its burden of proving good
cause for protection, the third prong of the test then shifts the burden to the
party seeking discovery to prove the information is relevant and necessary to
the action.55 This component is not satisfied if the party's arguments consist
primarily of supposition; rather, the party must demonstrate "a particularized
showing of substantial need. ' 56 This demonstration requires the party to
illustrate how the information requested will provide a necessary or essential
component in its case. Because "[r]elevancy is construed more broadly during
discovery than at trial,"5" the party seeking discovery need only show that the

(1991) (citing United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.RD. 40,46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
51. See, e.g., Pulsecard,1995 WL 526533, at *7 ("[I]n order to show good cause, the injury
which allegedly will result from disclosure must be shown with specificity, and that conclusory
statements to this effect are insufficient." (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1981))).

52. See IBMCorp., 67 F.R.D. at 47-48 (finding an allegation that disclosure of information
would be of value to its competitors to be too speculative).
53. See Duracell Inc. v. SW Consultants, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 576, 578 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("In
a competitive market, an entity's commercial information, its strategies, techniques, goals and
plans can be its life blood."); Gu6n6go, supranote 50, at 554-55.
54. See Automation Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Autoswage-Products, Inc., No. 128808, 1996
WL 278275, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6, 1996) (finding that the party seeking protection
of the information failed to prove the information was a trade secret or that good cause existed
to protect the alleged trade secret).
55. American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring the
plaintiff to prove the necessity and relevance of defendant's sales data to the case); ITT ElectroOptical Prods. Div. v. Electronic Tech. Corp., 161 F.R.D. 228, 231 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that
because the defendant met its burden of proving the first two prongs of the inquiry, the burden
shifted to the opposing party to prove that the information was relevant and necessary to the
action); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
("Once the party seeking a protective order has shown good cause therefore the party seeking
the discovery then has the burden ... of demonstrating reasonable necessity.").
56. In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 162 F.R.D. 355, 358 (D. Kan. 1995).
57. Id (finding that the defendant did not satisfy its burden of showing how the names of
the plaintiffs' suppliers were necessary or essential components of its defense).
58. ITEectro-Optical,161 F.R.D. at 231 (citing Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer
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information sought will be admissible or appear reasonably certain to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. 9 Although the party seeking discovery
need not prove the information will be used at trial, the test does act as a
judicial screen by serving to reject discovery requests aimed solely at obtaining
trade secrets that do not have any logical relationship to the case.
This third prong serves as the final weight in this balancing test. If the party
promoting discovery fails to prove relevancy and need, the trade secrets should
not be disclosed. On the other hand, the trade secrets should be disclosed if that
party does meet its burden, and the injury that might result is not proven by its
holder.' However, when both parties satisfy their respective burdens, the court
must then balance the need for disclosure with the severity of the injury that
will result if discovery is allowed."'
Once a court concludes the trade secrets should be disclosed, the inquiry
has not ended. The court must then determine in what manner and to whom the
information should be disclosed.62 At this point, the court must determine
whether widespread dissemination of the trade secret will result in "annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense" to the trade secret's
holder. 3 This requires balancing the potential harm to the party seeking
protection and the importance of public disclosure." Courts have "broad
discretion to control the scope of discovery,"6 and, therefore, a great deal of
flexibility in crafting the contents and scope of protective orders.' This allows
courts to use protective orders to limit dissemination of information to the
parties in the case and restrict the use of such information to litigation
purposes.67 Although courts have broad discretion under rule 26(c)(7) to craft

& Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 326 (10th Cir. 1981)).

59. See id.; East Colonial Refuse Serv., Inc. v. Velocci, 416 So. 2d 1276, 1277 (Fla. Dist.
CL App. 1982); Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 216 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. Ct. App.
1975).
60. 1TTElectro-Optical,161 F.R.D. at 231.
61.Id.

62. Miller, supranote 12, at 434 ("Once the court determines that the discovery policies
require that the materials be disclosed, the issue becomes whether they should be disclosed only
in a designated way ....).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
64. Miller, supranote 12, at 434-35.
65. JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 225 (2d ed. 1996) (citing
Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 319 S.E.2d 695
(1984)).

66. Miller, supranote 12, at 435.
67. Gohler v. Wood, 162 F.R.D. 691, 697 (D. Utah 1995) (stating that a protective order
limiting disclosure of information to those who were necessarily involved in the case, and
limiting the use of the information to purposes of the litigation, properly protected the
confidentiality concerns of the defendant). See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien Biao Bank Tanz.
Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that an order requiring the party seeking
discovery to identify any experts to whom it planned to show the information was adequate to
protect the interests of the holder).
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and issue protective orders, this freedom is not without boundaries. For
example, courts cannot delegate their responsibility to oversee the discovery
process by fashioning protective orders that allow the parties to determine what
information will be released to the public.68
Protective orders are often criticized as violative of the First Amendment
right to free speech.69 However, the United States Supreme Court has rejected
this argument and upheld the use ofjudicial discretion to restrict dissemination
of confidential information during pretrial civil discovery." The Court reasoned
that pretrial discovery is not a public component of a civil trial, and thus
restrictions on dissemination of this information do not deny access to truly
public information.7 '
In conclusion, the test used by most jurisdictions is a better method than
the discovery provisions found in the Trade Secrets Act for determining
whether to allow discovery of material one party claims is a trade secret.
Section 39-8-60(B) of the Trade Secrets Act strips courts of their discretion by
commanding them, when faced with a discovery request that seeks access to
information that may contain a trade secret, to require parties seeking discovery
to prove a substantial need for the information.72 The statutory rule further
limits judicial flexibility by providing a four-part definition of substantial
need.' While section 39-8-60(B) goes to great lengths to provide much needed
protection for businesses and individuals possessing trade secrets, it fails to
address the concems of an opposing party who legitimately needs the
information in order to prepare for trial.
In contrast, the test based on Rule 26(c) balances the interests of both the
party seeking discovery and the party opposing disclosure and also provides
adequate protection for the sensitive information. The test first requires the
party opposing discovery to prove that the information should be protected,

68. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996)

(requiring modification or vacation of a protective order that allowed the parties to control access
to court papers by deciding between themselves what information to release to the public); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 155 F.R.D. 113, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting

a protective order that gave each party the power to select which documents should be treated
as confidential because the order resulted in judicial discretion yielding to private judgment).
69. See Miller, supra note 12, at 436 ("iM]any courts and commentators argued that the
First Amendment itself limited a court's power to issue a protective order, regardless of the
content of the applicable procedural rules.").
70. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) ("[Wjhere ... a protective order
is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of
pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from
other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.").
71. Id at 33; see also Howard Publications, Inc. v. Lake Mich. Charters, Ltd., 649 N.E.2d
129, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (applying the reasoning of Seattle Times to uphold a protective
order that prohibited disclosure of confidential material to parties not involved in the litigation).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
73. Id.
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thus preventing that party from avoiding discovery of damaging information
simply by asserting that it contains trade secrets when it does not. Only when

the party has established that the information is a trade secret does the burden
then shift to the party seeking discovery to prove that it truly needs the
information to adequately prepare its case. This final burden is the most
difficult to satisfy. Essentially, the party seeking discovery is required to

establish the relevancy ofmaterial to which it has never been privileged. In the
interest ofjudicial efficiency, a party should not be saddled with such a burden
until the court has been convinced the information is a trade secret. In the final
analysis, the majority rule balances the rights of both parties by requiring each
to prove its contentions.
C. The Discovery Provisions of the South Carolina Trade
Secrets Act May Infringe upon the South CarolinaSupreme
Court's Authority to Promulgate Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
Discovery has long been considered a procedural device; therefore, courts
have exercised their power to promulgate rules governing this phase ofjudicial
proceedings.74 The South Carolina Supreme Court's power to establish rules
of procedure and practice is derived from three sources: (1) statutory
authority;75 (2) the South Carolina Constitution;76 and (3) the inherent powers

74. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947) ("The deposition-discovery rules
create integrated procedural devices."); see also Cole v. Cole Tomato Sales, Inc., 310 So. 2d 210,
212 (Ala. 1975) (recognizing Rule 26(c) as an efficient procedural mechanism by which to limit
discovery); Kutzgar v. Purcell, 691 So. 2d 264, 265 (La. Ct. App. 1997) ("Discovery is a
procedural device in pursuit ofrelief. It does not exist in the absence of a request for relief or for
perpetuation of testimony in contemplation of potential litigation.").
Legislation infringing upon this power of the courts has frequently been met by
constitutional challenges. See Miller, supranote 12i at 443-44. Miller discusses two instances
when legislation dealing with protective orders was questioned because it allegedly infringed
upon the authority of the judiciary to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. First, in 1991,
the Florida legislature passed a bill that prohibited Florida courts "from entering orders that
might have the effect of concealing 'public hazards' or any information that may be useful to the
public in protecting against 'public hazards."' Id. at 443. Although the legislature enacted the
law with very little opposition, questions about the Act's constitutionality subsequently arose.
Id. Concern developed over whether the legislature had overstepped its authority and intruded
on the Florida Supreme Court's "exclusive authority over matters of civil practice and
procedure." Id.
Second, in Louisiana, the legislature enacted a law that would have made it difficult for
manufacturers in the state to protect trade secrets and other proprietary information. However,
the Governor vetoed the bill because it unnecessarily interfered with judicial authority. Id. at
444.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-640 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
76. S.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 4.
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of the judicial branch.77
1.

StatutoryAuthority

The statutory source of the South Carolina Supreme Court's rule-making
power was first found in the Practice Act of 179 1,1 which gave the court power
to implement rules governing procedure as long as such rules were not
inconsistent with legislative enactments. 79 The current statutory grant of power
provides that "[tihe court may establish and promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this article
and to facilitate the work of the court."8 This statutory provision and its
historical predecessors have been labeled a delegation of the rule-making
power from the General Assembly to the courts.8 Like any delegation of
power, "the power conferred by such enabling legislation is not permanent and
may be recalled, or the legislature may expunge, modify, or supersede
particular court rules, even without the express reservation of that right."82
2. ConstitutionalRule-MakingAuthority
The constitutional source for the South Carolina Supreme Court's power
over practice and procedure is found in article V of the South Carolina
Constitution.83 Section four of article V provides in pertinent part: "The
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all the courts
of the State. Subject to the statutory law, the Supreme Court shall make rules
governing the practice and procedure in all such courts."' 4 This section of
article V unequivocally grants rule-making power to the supreme court, but it
also limits this power by including language that presumably subordinates the
court's power to that of the General Assembly. 5 Evidence of this subordination

77. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
78. No. 1491, § IV, 7 S.C. Stat. 260, 262 (McCord 1840) [hereinafter Practice Act].
79. Thomas DeWitt Rogers, III, Comment, The ProceduralRule-Making Power of the

South CarolinaSupreme Court,30 S.C. L. REV. 625, 628 (1979) (citing § IV of The Practice Act
of 1791). The Practice Act provided: "[The... courts may... make such just and reasonable
rules and orders for the more regular and convenient conducting and effectual dispatch of
business therein, as to them shall seem necessary and proper ..... Practice Act, supra note 78,

§IV.
80. S.C. CODEANN. § 14-3-640 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
81. See Rogers, supranote 79, at 628.
82. Id. at 629 (footnotes omitted).

83. See S.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 4.
84. Id.
85. Rogers, supra note 79, at 630 (concluding that the "subject to the law" limitation
indicates that the court's exercise of its rule-making power is not unchecked). Moreover, in
Stokes v. Denmark Emergency Medical Services, 315 S.C. 263, 433 S.E.2d 850 (1993), the
supreme court recognized that "[tlhe clause 'subject to the statutory law' establishes the intent
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of the court's authority also may be found in the requirements imposed by
section 4A of article V.86 This provision requires the supreme court to submit
all proposed rules and amendments governing practice and procedure to the
General Assembly for approval." Indeed, in Stokes v. DenmarkEmergency
Medical Services," the supreme court recognized that this provision does not
grant exclusive rule-making authority to the court. 9 In Stokes, the plaintiff
asserted that the General Assembly's enactment of section 15-33-125 of the
South Carolina Code unconstitutionally infringed upon the court's rule-making

authority." The supreme court rejected this argument and noted that the
General Assembly also has rule-making authority. 9' The court found that
section 4A "merely sets forth the procedure for the Court to follow when it
promulgates rules and amendments. It does not restrict promulgation only to
the Court."' Therefore, even though the legislation had an impact on an
existing procedural rule, the General Assembly's action did not infringe upon
the court's authority to promulgate procedural rules and thus did not violate the
constitution. 93
Although the Stokes opinion may be read so that the court's rule-making
power is completely subordinate to the General Assembly, the supreme court
has not actually defined the parameters of this subordination. Some
jurisdictions have addressed this same issue and concluded that the power to
promulgate truly procedural rules, such as rules governing discovery, is not
subordinate to legislative action.94 In Winberry v. SalisburjP the New Jersey

to subordinate to the General Assembly the Court's rulemaking power in regard to practice and
procedure." Id. at 267, 433 S.E.2d at 852.
86. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4A.
87. Id. This section provides:
All rules and amendments to rules governing practice and procedure
in all courts of this State promulgated by the Supreme Court must be
submitted by the Supreme Court to the Judiciary Committee of each House
of the General Assembly during a regular session, but not later than the
first day of February during each session. Such rules or amendments shall
become effective ninety calendar days after submission unless disapproved
by concurrent resolution ofthe General Assembly, with the concurrence of
three-fifths of the members of each House present and voting.
Id.
88. 315 S.C. 263, 433 S.E.2d 850 (1993).
89. Id. at 266, 433 S.E.2d at 852.
90. Id. at 266, 433 S.E.2d at 851.
91. Id. at 266, 433 S.E.2d at 852.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 267, 433 S.E.2d at 852.
94. See, e.g., Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 1047 (Alaska 1981) (finding that
an existing rule of civil procedure promulgated by the court prevailed over a statute that was
procedural in nature); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406,414 (N.J. 1950) ("Mhe rule-making
power of the [New Jersey] Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation, but... it is
confined to practice, procedure and administration as such."); see also Charles W. Joiner &
Oscar J. Miller, Rules ofPracticeand Procedure: A Study ofJudicialRule Making, 55 MIcH.
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Supreme Court examined the implications of a phrase in the New Jersey
Constitution that similarly subordinated the court's rule-making authority. 96
This phrase provided: "The Supreme Court [of New Jersey] shall make rules
governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the
practice and procedure in all such courts." 97 In the court's opinion, the phrase
"subject to law" refers to substantive law as distinguished from pleading and
practice. 98 In fact, the phrase "serves as a continuous reminder that the rulemaking power as to practice and procedure must not invade the field of the
substantive law as such."' Although Winbery has been extensively debated," °
application of that court's approach to the discovery provisions of the Trade
Secrets Act would render these provisions unconstitutional because discovery
is arguably a purely procedural mechanism and should be reserved for the
judiciary."' Such an approach may also be reconciled with the South Carolina
Supreme Court's holding in Stokes because the legislation at issue in that case
implicated the denial of the right to a jury,0 2 which arguably has substantive
considerations and is not purely procedural. 3
3. Inherent Rule-Making Power
Courts in many jurisdictions have claimed an inherent power over practice
and procedure; ° however, these courts have failed to indicate the source of
this power. 0 5 One court has stated that "[t]he inherent power of a court is an
unexpressed quantity and an undefinable term, and courts have indulged in
more or less loose explanations concerning it."" Although the source of this
inherent power is vague, the following three theories of its origins have been
advanced: "authority by necessity or implication, authority by historical

L. REv. 623, 630 (1957) (",V]hen the purpose of the rule is to provide for the establishment and
maintenance of the machinery essential for the efficient administration ofjudicial business, and
it does only that, the scope of the inherent power vested in the courts is complete and supreme.").
95. 74 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1950).

96. Id. at 408.

97. N.J. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2, 3.
98. Winberry, 74 A.2d at 410.
99. Id.
100. See A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over JudicialRuleMaking: A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 & n.119 (1958).
101. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 94, at 648-49.
102. Stokes v. Denmark Emergency Med. Servs., 315 S.C. 263, 266, 433 S.E.2d 850, 851
(1993).
103. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 100, at 19.
104. Rogers, supranote 79, at 233 (citing Annot., 158 A.L.Rt 705 (1945); Annot., 110
A.L.R. 22 (1937)).
105. See, e.g., Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 154 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1944) ("mhis
court is not powerless to formulate rules of procedure when justice demands it." However, the
court never provided a source for this power.).
106. In re Waugh, 72 P. 710, 710 (Wash. 1903).
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analogy, and authority by separation of powers.""0 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court has defined its inherent powers as
"'powers included within the scope of a court's jurisdiction which a court
possesses irrespective of specific grant by Constitution or legislation. Such

powers can neither be taken away nor abridged by .the legislature.""" 8 Like
many courts, the South Carolina Supreme Court has failed to identify the
source of this power. However, in Williams v. Bordon's,Inc., 9 the supreme
court relied on the separation of powers doctrine to find a law that dictated
when courts should grant continuances unconstitutional." 0 The court found that
its adjudicative power "carries with it the inherent power to control the order
of its business to safeguard the rights of litigants.""' According to the court,
"[t]he authority to determine whether a continuance should be granted or
denied" is within the inherent power of the court, and such judicial power
cannot be exercised by the General Assembly without violating the
constitution. 12
The court's reasoning in Williams has been criticized because it is not in
harmony with the court's historically flexible interpretation of the separation
of powers clause."' Moreover, one commentator described the court's holding
as a "broad extension of the judicial power coupled with a strict interpretation
of the separation of powers clause.""' 4 However, the existence of such inherent
judicial power has been recognized by many courts" 5 and commentators," 6 so

107. Rogers, supranote 79, at 633.
108. State ex rel. McLeod v. Hite, 272 S.C. 303, 305, 251 S.E.2d 746,747 (1979) (citing
20 AM. JuR. 2D Courts § 78 (1995)); see Greenfield v. Greenfield, 245 S.C. 604, 610, 141 S.E.2d
920, 923 (1965) ("The inherent powers of a court, which are essential to its existence and
protection and to the due administration ofjustice ... do not depend upon express constitutional
or legislative grant."); Hamaas v. State, 279 S.C. 592, 595, 310 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ct. App. 1983)
("Courts have the inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to insure that just results
are reached to the fullest extent possible.").
109. 274 S.C. 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980).
110. Id. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884. The separation of powers clause of the South Carolina
Constitution provides: "In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person
or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the
duties of any other." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
111. Williams, 274 S.C. at 279, 262 S.E.2d at 883.
112. Id. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884.
113. See Belton T. Zeigler, Survey, ConstitutionalLaw-Separationof Powers, 33 S.C. L.
REV.21, 32 (1981).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Kunkel v. Walton, No. 81176, 1997 WL 720867, at *3 (I11.
Nov. 20, 1997)
(deriving the court's inherent powers from "'the undisputed duty of the court to protect its
judicial powers from encroachment.., and thus preserve an independent judicial department'
(quoting Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (111. 1952))); People v. Bainter, 533
N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ill.
1989) (stating that legislative action may not infringe upon the
judiciary's inherent powers); Goldberg v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (Nev.
1977) ("[I]t is clear that the judiciary, as a coequal branch of government, has inherent powers
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future reliance on this power to control procedure is not as misplaced as some
might conclude.
In addition to the legal arguments, the policy arguments for vesting the
court with the sole power to control procedure outweigh the advantages of
sharing this power with the General Assembly. For example, judicial rules may
be molded and changed by courts as needed, whereas rigid statutes require "all
the pomp and circumstance of repeal or of legislative amendment before they
can be abrogated or improved." ' 1 7 Therefore the rule-making authority should
rest in the judiciary because judicially promulgated rules grow out of the
experiences ofjudges rather than out of "the ax-grinding desires of particular
law-makers.""' 8 Regular review and revision of procedural rules is required,
and the General Assembly has neither the time nor the resources to carefully
consider all of the implications such rules may have on the daily administration
ofjustice.
Because the supreme court in South Carolina has not yet clearly defined
the extent of its power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, the
outcome of a constitutional challenge to the discovery provisions of the Trade
Secrets Act is unclear. The discovery provisions appear to be piecemeal
legislative tinkering with judicially promulgated procedural rules."' This
tinkering diminishes the judicial wisdom and experience reflected in the rules
of civil procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act provides much needed, general
protection for information that can serve as a cornerstone for the vitality of
businesses, especially in the manufacturing and technology industries.
However, the special discovery provisions of the Trade Secrets Act fail to
account for the rights and needs of parties that require access to such
information in order to prepare for trial. By extending such one-sided
protection to holders of trade secrets during the discovery process, the South
Carolina General Assembly may have gone too far in its attempt to further the
state's goal of becoming a leader in new business development Statistics show
that the realization of this goal has had, and is continuing to have, positive

to administer its affairs, which include rule-making and other incidental powers reasonable and
necessary to carry out the duties required for the administration ofjustice." (citations omitted));
Maples v. State, 791 P.2d 788, 790 (N.M. 1990) (explaining that the inherent powers of the court
include the right to set the time period in which appeals are to be heard).
116. See Henry M. Dowling, The Inherent Powerof the Judiciary,21 A.B.A. J. 635, 635
(1935); Joiner & Miller, supra note 94, at 629.
117. Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power oftthe Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 602 (1926).
118. Id.
119. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 100, at 38.
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economic effects in South Carolina. 2 ' However, in attempting to complete this
task, the General Assembly has ignored the importance of safeguarding
litigants' interests.
Although the extent of the South Carolina General Assembly's control
over judicial procedure is not clear, the legislature should yield to the wisdom
of the judiciary in the area of discovery. Instead of following the rigid test set
forth in the Trade Secrets Act, South Carolina courts should be permitted to
follow the well-paved route blazed by the majority of jurisdictions in the
United States. This avenue of providing protection accounts for the rights and
needs of both the parties seeking discovery of the trade secrets and the holders
of the information. Consequently, this method-based on existing procedural
rules-provides a balanced approach, while at the same time affording
sufficient protection for trade secrets.
Mark V. Thigpen

120. See AMNUAL REPORT, supranote 24, at A-4 (showing that new and expanding business
investment in South Carolina totalled nearly $6 billion in 1996).
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